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Abstract 23 
Objectives: Traditional theories of motor learning (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967), along with 24 
certain contemporary psychological perspectives (e.g., Weiss & Reber, 2012; Wulf, 2013), 25 
postulate that expert performers must relinquish paying conscious attention to, and/or 26 
attempting to exert control over, their bodily movements in order to achieve optimal 27 
performance. Challenging such largely unquestioned conceptual approaches, however, is an 28 
emerging body of evidence (e.g., see Montero, 2010; Shusterman, 2011) which indicates that 29 
‘somatic reflection’ (i.e., a conscious focus on bodily movement) is an important mediator of 30 
continuous improvement (i.e., the fact that certain performers continue to improve their skills 31 
even after becoming experts) at the elite level of sport. The present position paper seeks to 32 
elucidate and resolve this apparent paradox concerning the role of bodily awareness in 33 
expertise. Method: To achieve this latter aim, we draw on empirical evidence (e.g., from 34 
research on somatic attention) and theory (e.g., Shusterman’s, 2008, theory of body 35 
consciousness) to elucidate the role of bodily awareness in facilitating continuous 36 
improvement at the elite level of sport. Results and conclusion: In doing so, we sketch some 37 
theoretical and practical implications of Shusterman’s (2008, 2011, 2012) theory of 38 
‘somaesthetics’ for contemporary research on expertise in sport.  39 
Keywords: Expertise, somaesthetics, conscious processing 40 
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Enhancing performance proficiency at the expert level: considering the role of 48 
‘somaesthetic awareness’ 49 
One of the traditionally unquestioned hallmarks of expert performance in any domain 50 
is its automaticity – the fact that it appears to occur rapidly, efficiently, and without the need 51 
for conscious control or monitoring (Moors, 2013). To illustrate the last of these 52 
characteristics, consider the research literature on peak performance in sport. According to 53 
Martin and Jackson (2008), such performance typically involves “action-awareness merging 54 
(doing things spontaneously and automatically without having to think)” (p. 146) with little 55 
or no conscious processing of technical movements. A good example of this state of mind 56 
comes from golfer Paul McGinley who revealed that after holing a six-foot putt to win the 57 
Ryder cup for Europe against the USA “at no time did I even consider the mechanics of the 58 
stroke” (cited in Kremer & Moran, 2013, p. 72). Such peak performance experiences bolster 59 
the assumption in sport psychology that conscious processing tends to impair skill execution 60 
in experts. This view is also apparent in conventional explanations for the “paralysis-by-61 
analysis” phenomenon in sport whereby skilled performance tends to deteriorate whenever 62 
athletes try to exert conscious control over movements that had previously been under 63 
automatic control. Thus Masters (2012) suggested that paying conscious attention to the step-64 
by-step processes involved in skill execution will disrupt ‘habitual’ movement and 65 
performance. Similarly, Weiss and Reber (2012) argue that problems are likely to arise ‘when 66 
an athlete stops using the smooth and practiced techniques and begins to use excessive 67 
thinking and “reinvests” effort back to motor functions and one’s physical problems’ (p. 68 
176). Instead, performers are encouraged to direct their attention away from their bodily 69 
movement and to adopt an external focus of attention (i.e., focusing on the effects of their 70 
movements; see Wulf, 2013, for review) in order to facilitate smooth and fluent skill 71 
execution (we return to this body of literature later).  72 
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 However, challenges to these latter perspectives are increasingly apparent. In particular, 73 
two key strands of evidence from psychology and inter-disciplinary studies converge on the 74 
conclusion that sometimes (e.g., when skills break down due to injury), somatic awareness 75 
(i.e., paying attention to one’s bodily movements) can actually enhance athletes’ skill-76 
learning and performance. This convergence may be summarised briefly as follows. Firstly, 77 
at the theoretical level, an emerging inter-disciplinary movement known as “somaesthetics” 78 
(Shusterman, 2008; 2009; 2011) has begun to investigate the role of consciousness in body 79 
awareness and skill learning. Influenced by advances in phenomenology (e.g., see the idea of 80 
“applying intelligence to the reflexes”; Sutton, McIlwain, Christensen, & Geeves, 2011) and 81 
the embodied cognition paradigm in psychology which postulates that many of the brain 82 
circuits responsible for abstract thinking are grounded in those that process sensory 83 
experience (see more detailed accounts in Glenberg, Witt, & Metcalfe, 2013; Laakso, 2011), 84 
Shusterman’s (2011) theory of “somaesthetic awareness” is concerned with exploring “the 85 
differences between those occasions when heightened somatic consciousness is helpful and 86 
when it is detrimental” (p. 319) to skill-learning and performance. According to Shusterman 87 
(2008), somatic attention is helpful when “we need to correct, relearn, and adjust our habits 88 
of spontaneous performance” (p. 138). Clearly, theorists from several disciplines propose that 89 
bodily awareness is not always deleterious to performance and indeed, may be necessary in 90 
order to facilitate ‘continuous improvement’ at the elite level of sport.  91 
Secondly, at the empirical level, research on the topic of ‘skill recovery’ shows that 92 
athletes who are trying to regain prior levels of high-level performance often deliberately use 93 
conscious processing strategies to refine or restore elite level habitual movements in sports 94 
such as javelin throwing, sprinting and swimming (Collins, Morriss, & Trower, 1999; Hanin, 95 
Korjus, & Jouste, 2002; Hanin, Malvela, & Hanina, 2004). In studies of this topic, 96 
researchers have helped athletes to regain or to refine habitual movement patterns by 97 
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encouraging them to become more consciously aware of technical and kinaesthetic 98 
differences between current (problematic) and desired actions. In this regard, Carson, Collins, 99 
and Jones (submitted) recently investigated the issue of consciously-elicited technical 100 
refinement in an Olympic weightlifter. This athlete had acquired an injury through the use of 101 
inefficient technique in the two hand snatch. Carson et al. sought to heighten the athlete’s 102 
kinaesthetic awareness of the difference between the new, more effective technique and the 103 
position (replacing the bar with a broomstick) that had caused the initial injury. Here the 104 
athlete’s limb positioning was manipulated towards a more effective and less injury prone 105 
technique, thereby facilitating kinaesthetic awareness of the different feelings and positions. 106 
Clearly, these studies show that bodily awareness can help athletes to generate distinctions 107 
between kinaesthetic sensations in order to “realise the required changes” (Carson & Collins, 108 
2011, p. 152). More generally, such refined conscious awareness may have adaptive 109 
significance. Thus, on the basis of evidence highlighting the role of the cerebellum in the 110 
conscious control of motor behaviour, Rossano (2003) concluded that “evolution has 111 
fashioned the human brain with specific systems that bring consciousness and motor control 112 
into a close relationship” (p. 209). In summary, despite recent arguments that expert 113 
performers must relinquish conscious attention of their bodily movements in order to achieve 114 
optimal performance (e.g., see Masters & Maxwell, 2008; Wulf, 2013), alternative evidence 115 
has emerged to suggest that deliberately paying conscious attention to specific components of 116 
movement (e.g., limb positioning) may improve and/or restore their efficiency (e.g., Gray, 117 
2004; Shusterman, 2008). So, how can we reconcile these opposing viewpoints about the role 118 
of bodily awareness in skill-learning and skilled performance? 119 
 In an effort to resolve this confusion, this opinion paper draws on evidence (e.g., 120 
concerning somatic attention) and theory (e.g., see Shusterman’s, 2008, theory of 121 
somaesthetics) to elucidate the circumstances in which it is beneficial to replace an external 122 
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focus of attention with enhanced conscious awareness of problematic movements. The paper 123 
is organised as follows. We begin by analyzing briefly the philosophical and psychological 124 
roots of the assumption that expert performance involves the execution of bodily movements 125 
that are not consciously monitored  – what  Gallagher (2011) calls “performative 126 
forgetfulness of the body” (p. 305). Next, we point to the problematic nature of this 127 
assumption by drawing on evidence which indicates that skilled performers use bodily 128 
awareness when seeking to identify and refine ‘attenuated’ movements during practice. After 129 
that, we argue that Shusterman’s theory of body consciousness may address some of the 130 
shortcomings associated with a number of influential motor control theories (e.g., 131 
Information processing approaches; Ideomotor approaches) by identifying the mechanisms 132 
that enable performers to alternate between different modes of bodily awareness or foci of 133 
attention. Finally, we sketch some practical and methodological implications of Shusterman’s 134 
(2008, 2011, 2012) somaesthetics for contemporary research on expertise in sport. 135 
 What are the modern philosophical roots of sport psychology’s antagonism to bodily 136 
awareness in expert performance? According to Shusterman (2008), William James 137 
cautioned against somatic awareness when one is performing well-learned or habitual 138 
movements. Specifically, he proclaimed that “heightened consciousness of the bodily means 139 
of action leads to failure in achieving our desired ends” (cited in Shusterman, 2008, p. xi). 140 
Also, according to James (1983), “habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our 141 
acts are performed” (p. 31).  For James (1911), any conscious attentional focus on habitual 142 
movement and its accompanying somatic feelings is likely to disrupt skilled action: - “Trust 143 
your spontaneity and fling away all further care” was his aphorism for successful motor 144 
performance (p. 72). More recently, Merleau-Ponty (1964) postulated that spontaneity will 145 
always facilitate optimal functioning while any form of body awareness or somatic reflection 146 
will compromise smooth and efficient performance. More specifically, he insisted that 147 
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spontaneous bodily intentionality is a pre-requisite for successful performance as our 148 
movement is governed by a “spontaneity which will not tolerate any commands, not even 149 
those which I would like to give myself” (p. 75).   150 
 These philosophical perspectives appear to be in line with a number of influential 151 
theories of motor skill learning (e.g., Information processing – IP) which emphasise the 152 
effortless and automatic nature of skilful action. For example, the IP approach has sought to 153 
explain motor skill learning with a model that portrays the performer as progressing from a 154 
controlled, conscious and declarative mode of information processing (i.e., at the novice 155 
stage) to a more automatic and proceduralised mode of processing (i.e., at the expert stage). 156 
Based on a digital computer metaphor, the mind is seen as an information processor that 157 
begins to deal with available information from the environment (input), processes this 158 
information using various operations, and eventually produces an action (output) (Schmidt & 159 
Wrisberg, 2008). Accordingly, we perceive sensory information from the external world 160 
which, in turn, is translated into a syntactic code of meaningful symbols, and processed 161 
according to a systematic set of rules (Maes, Leman, Palmer, & Wanderley, 2014). The IP 162 
approach argues that coordinated movement sequences are governed by ‘motor programs’ 163 
which are made up of mental representations which develop into plans of actions, 164 
instructions, or rules that guide the production of a skill (Bailey & Pickard, 2010). These 165 
motor programs are believed to guide skilful action in the absence of direct conscious control 166 
and are seen to represent the expression of habitual or automatic responses in a given sporting 167 
context. Although the ubiquity of IP models bears testament to their utility as a means of 168 
helping us understand skill learning, they have been heavily criticised for presenting a 169 
peculiarly disembodied account of motor skill learning (see Bailey & Pickard, 2010; Sutton et 170 
al. 2011). That is, IP models consider body movements to represent mere outcomes of these 171 
symbol manipulations and, as a result, ignore the mutual influence that perception and action 172 
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exert on each other (Maes et al. 2014). 173 
 To address this latter issue, embodied cognition theories have sought to explain how the 174 
human body (with its perceptual and motor systems) interacts with the outside world. Within 175 
this framework of embodied cognition, the ideomotor approach (see Greenwald, 1970) has 176 
presented an influential explanation of the cognitive mechanisms underlying voluntary action 177 
selection (Koch, Keller, & Prinz, 2004). This theory postulates that actions are cognitively 178 
represented in terms of their anticipated sensory consequences (response effects) and that the 179 
anticipation of these latter effects may serve as a mental cue to activate the corresponding 180 
movement. This ideo-motor principle has been expressed in a number of theoretical works 181 
including Prinz’s (1997) common-coding approach and Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & 182 
Prinz’s (2001) theory of event coding. A considerable volume of empirical evidence 183 
supporting the ideomotor principle has emerged in studies which have examined participants’ 184 
selection, planning, and initiation of simple discrete actions (e.g., speeded effector 185 
coordination in dual-task situations or choice-reaction tasks). For example, Elsner and 186 
Hommel (2001) required participants to perform key presses (which produced auditory 187 
effects) in an initial training phase. In the test phase, these effects served as imperative 188 
stimuli in a choice-reaction task.  Subsequently, a response was selected more promptly when 189 
primed by its former effect tone than when triggered by the effect tone associated with an 190 
alternative response.  191 
 Do the response effects for the learning of simple discrete actions transfer to the 192 
production of relatively complex action sequences that characterize most sporting activities? 193 
Based on ideomotor principles, Wulf’s constrained action hypothesis (see Wulf, McNevin, & 194 
Shea, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Park, 2001) predicts that complex movements (in any sporting 195 
performance) will be more effective when planned in terms of their intended outcome or 196 
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effect (i.e., with an external focus), rather than in terms of the specific movement patterns 197 
(i.e., with an internal focus). In seeking to explain this effect, Wulf (2013) postulated that an 198 
internal focus of attention “induces a conscious type of control, causing individuals to 199 
constrain their motor system by interfering with automatic control processes” (p. 91, our 200 
italics). Accordingly, Wulf and her colleagues recommended that athletes should adopt an 201 
external focus which requires attending to the effects of one’s movement on the environment 202 
(e.g., the trajectory of a tennis ball as it leaves one’s racket). This latter focus of attention is 203 
believed to facilitate a more automatic mode of control and has also been found to improve 204 
both movement effectiveness (e.g., accuracy in hitting a target) and movement efficiency 205 
(i.e., outlay of energy, or of time and energy) amongst novice and skilled performers in a 206 
wide variety of skills and tasks (e.g., Bell & Hardy, 2009; Lohse, Sherwood, & Healy, 2010; 207 
Lohse, Wulf, & Lewthwaite, 2012; Schücker, Hagemann, & Strauss, 2013).  208 
It should be noted, however, that some researchers have contradicted Wulf’s claim 209 
that an internal focus of attention will inevitably disrupt skilled performance and learning. 210 
For example, Oudejans, Koedijker, and Beek (2007) argued that an internal focus of attention 211 
may “be indispensable when an athlete seeks to replace a suboptimal technique by a more 212 
optimal one in order to reach a higher level of performance” (p. 41). Unfortunately, most 213 
ideomotor accounts have focused solely on manipulating exteroceptive (feedback delivered 214 
by visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory pathways) or remote effects in their experiments. 215 
Accordingly, Wulf’s constrained action hypothesis (and ideomotor theories more generally) 216 
have yet to adequately explain how performers appear capable of maintaining performance 217 
proficiency by using ‘interoceptive feedback’ (which is delivered by proprioception including 218 
kinaesthetic feeling of the movement) to alter and control bodily movements during training. 219 
For example, Nyberg (in press) found that elite freeskiers learn how to discern (i.e., through 220 
‘focal awareness’) their rotational velocity to such an extent that they “know whether they 221 
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will be able to perform the trick the way it was intended without adjustments, or whether they 222 
will need to make adjustments during the flight phase” (p. 7). Also, in a naturalistic 223 
investigation of the attentional foci adopted by elite golfers during training and competition, 224 
Bernier, Codron, Thienot and Fournier (2011) found that elite golfers adjusted their 225 
attentional focus (i.e., moving back-and-forth between focusing on bodily movements and the 226 
effects of their actions) across training and competitive situations. Clearly, a reliance on an 227 
external focus of attention is not enough to maintain performance effectiveness at the elite 228 
level of sport. Instead, elite performers would appear to avoid excessive ‘proceduralisation’ 229 
because they must be able on demand to deliberately access and “strategically re-route any 230 
semi-automated routines” (Sutton, 2007, p. 769). 231 
 Similarly, performers have little choice but to reinvest conscious attention owing to the 232 
‘sudden volatile transformations’ (Bissell, 2013, p. 122) that appear to afflict our habitual 233 
movements. In fact, anecdotal reports abound of elite performers having to change habitual 234 
behaviours in order to maintain performance proficiency. For example, Bernhard Langer, the 235 
two-time Golf major champion, changed his putting stroke on a number of occasions in an 236 
attempt to combat the ‘yips’, a movement disorder which represents perhaps the most volatile 237 
form of habit disruption. Despite anecdotal evidence pointing to the volatility of habitual 238 
behavior (e.g., Bissell, 2013; Eden, 2013), and empirical evidence that elite athletes may 239 
employ conscious attentional strategies to successfully refine their ‘attenuated habits’ (e.g., 240 
Hanin et al. 2004), the received wisdom in sport psychology is that consciously attending to 241 
habitual movement impairs skilled performance (Poolton & Masters, 2010; Wulf, 2012). To 242 
illustrate, Wulf (2012) warns against the reliance on ‘traditional’ instructional methods – 243 
namely, those that involve declarative feedback on body movements as well as those that 244 
make ‘intuitive sense’ to coaches. As previously discussed, Wulf (2012, 2013) claims that 245 
instructions or feedback relating to body movements will always prove deleterious to motor 246 
ENHANCING PERFORMANCE PROFICIENCY  11 
 
learning and performance. Likewise, others have taken a critical stance when evaluating the 247 
role of ‘traditional’ methods of instruction which may encourage body awareness. For 248 
example, Poolton and Masters (2010) argued that “sensations of imbalance, tension or loss of 249 
rhythm detected by a player can easily become signposts that direct the player towards swing 250 
adjustments that are consciously controlled” (p. 121). Instead of focusing internally, these 251 
latter researchers encourage performers to divert attention away from their limb movement 252 
and, instead, focus on the environmental effects on their actions (e.g., in baseball we may 253 
focus on the trajectory of a ball once it has left our bat).  254 
If a coach subscribes to certain lines of thought (e.g., see Wulf’s 2012, 2013, 255 
argument above) that emphasize the debilitative nature of bodily awareness then how does he 256 
or she go about solving an elite athlete’s problematic or ‘attenuated’ habit? It seems highly 257 
improbable that encouraging the athlete either to ‘trust’ their spontaneity or to adopt an 258 
external focus of attention will help the expert performer who, for example, may be 259 
experiencing disruption to performance proficiency because of an unintended change in their 260 
technique (e.g., see Carson et al.). If a continued reliance on focusing on the effects of one’s 261 
actions (i.e., thereby avoiding any focus on bodily movement) proves to be ineffective then 262 
how should the expert performer seek to address problematic movement patterns? According 263 
to Shusterman (2008) ‘we cannot simply trust our habits to correct themselves through 264 
unconscious trial and error or through eventual evolutionary adjustments’ (p. 13). In fact, to 265 
act spontaneously or to remain focused on the effects of our actions will ‘simply reinforce 266 
these bad habits and the damage they cause’ (Shusterman, 2008, p. 169). For example, an 267 
elite golfer who wishes to increase the distance she hits the ball is unlikely to do so merely by 268 
focusing on some distal action effect (as proposed by proponents of ideomotor approaches) 269 
like the trajectory of a ball. Instead, she would be required to alter and improve her bodily 270 
movements (e.g., increase shoulder turn) in order to generate greater club-head speed and 271 
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thereby produce the desired effect (i.e., increased distance). Unfortunately, continuing to 272 
focus on the effects of one’s actions may represent a form of ‘end-gaining’ which contributes 273 
to distorted ‘sensory appreciation’ and diverts our attention from the needed ‘means-274 
whereby’ the action could be performed properly. 275 
On such occasions, it seems reasonable to speculate that the inefficient or affected 276 
habit must be brought under the control of consciousness so that the coach can help the 277 
athlete regain the ‘old’ desirable technique or refine and acquire a new optimal movement 278 
pattern (Carson & Collins, 2011). As Shusterman puts it, “the unreflective action or habit 279 
must be brought into conscious critical reflection (though only for a limited time) so that it 280 
can be grasped and worked on more precisely” (2009, p.135). It is these arguments which 281 
have raised our concern that traditional motor learning theories, and some contemporary 282 
psychological perspectives, have failed to fully consider the potentially functional role that 283 
conscious bodily awareness may play in maintaining performance proficiency/facilitating 284 
skill advancement at the expert/elite level.  285 
We propose that researchers require a theoretical framework that can explain how 286 
skilled athletes are capable of flexibly allocating their attentional resources in order to refine 287 
problematic bodily movement. Accordingly, we believe it may be of value to consider 288 
Shusterman’s (2008, 2009) model of body consciousness which emphasises the 289 
interchanging phases or stages of learning. Specifically, Shusterman’s perspective may help 290 
researchers understand better how performers can use conscious bodily awareness in a 291 
manner which facilitates performance effectiveness. In line with traditional motor learning 292 
theories (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) and contemporary psychological skill acquisition 293 
perspectives (e.g., Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & Starkes, 2002; Gray, 2004), Shusterman 294 
(2008) acknowledges that reflective action (i.e., conscious awareness of bodily movement) is 295 
generally the most effective way to learn and perform at the novice level. As previously 296 
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noted, this stage of learning appears to require conscious and critical bodily attention during 297 
on-line performance of a motor task. However, traditional motor learning theories posit that 298 
once we move beyond this learning stage there is no need to explicitly attend to what our 299 
bodies are doing. It is on this matter that Shusterman’s (2008) viewpoint appears to differ 300 
significantly from those of traditional motor learning and some current sport psychology 301 
researchers. To explain, Shusterman (2008) urges us to consider the role that critical self-302 
attention may play after the learner has reached an automatised or habitual state of 303 
performance. For Shusterman, this is a critical issue to consider as “the learning process is 304 
never entirely complete” (p. 138). Shusterman (2009) argues that reflective body 305 
consciousness is necessary for correcting bad habits and achieving more efficient control of 306 
our movement. Here he suggests that we must know what we are doing with our bodies in 307 
order to understand how we can correct our problematic movements and more effectively do 308 
what we wish to do with them. In clarifying this outlook, Shusterman (2008) confirms that he 309 
is not advocating that we consciously attend to all of our actions – that would be both 310 
impossible and detrimental to performance. But, when our habits prove defective (e.g., due to 311 
injury) Shusterman (2009) suggests that careful attention to our bodily means (and attendant 312 
feelings) of action is necessary to “either acquire new habits or refine or reconstruct our 313 
habitual modes of action” (p. 138) and that this process necessitates the redirection of 314 
conscious attention to our somatic behaviour. 315 
Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that motor learning theorists are beginning 316 
to adopt similar perspectives concerning the potentially functional role bodily awareness may 317 
play at the elite level of sport. For example, Beilock and Gray (2007) acknowledged that 318 
“skill-focused attention may not always be detrimental to well-learned performances” (p. 319 
432) and that conscious attention may be required to rectify problematic bodily 320 
habits/movements. This may be necessary when the performer needs to alter performance 321 
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processes to achieve a different outcome rather than to maximise real-time performance 322 
(Beilock & Gray, 2007, p. 432). The authors argue that on such occasions it is necessary to 323 
slow down and ‘dechunk’ habitual movements. Here, the overall movement pattern may be 324 
broken down into separate steps or ‘chunks’ with the intention to address the problematic 325 
component of movement. This process will inevitably require the performer to ‘reinvest’ 326 
conscious attention in an effort to deliberately and consciously alter the ‘attenuated’ 327 
movement. For example, a coach may engage an athlete in a program of ‘associative training’ 328 
by using strategically placed mirrors to help develop awareness of the difference between the 329 
old (undesirable) movement and the new (desirable) movement (Shusterman, 2008). Here, 330 
the coach might manipulate the performer’s limb movement into the desired position and 331 
encourage them to associate different visual ‘forms’ with different proprioceptive feelings. 332 
Next, the performer is likely to use this proprioceptive feel for the new position (e.g., shorter 333 
backswing in golf) as they seek to consciously alter the ‘attenuated’ movement and acquire 334 
this new backswing position. Note, at this stage, there is only a focus on the movement itself 335 
and no reference to any distal action effects.  336 
Shusterman (2008, 2011) presents a compelling argument concerning the functional 337 
role bodily awareness may play in improving our self-use and the efficiency with which we 338 
perform habitual movements. However, such perspectives have yet to be incorporated within 339 
a general theory of motor skill acquisition (Gray, 2004). As discussed earlier, an idea 340 
consistent across a number of skill acquisition theories is that the acquisition process occurs 341 
in a unidirectional manner (i.e., moving from the cognitive to the associative to the 342 
procedural stage). In contrast to this latter perspective, however, Shusterman’s (2008) theory 343 
of body consciousness is cyclical in the sense that the maintenance of effective movement 344 
requires the individual to alternate between these various stages. That is, if the performer 345 
acquires an ‘attenuated’ habit then he/she will be required to move from a procedural (i.e., 346 
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automatic) mode of performance to a cognitive mode so that conscious attention can be 347 
devoted to the alteration or refinement of the problematic movement. Interestingly, this 348 
perspective is in line with Sutton et al.’s (2011) recent account of the nature and role of 349 
mindedness and thought in embodied action. To illustrate, Sutton et al.’s ‘applying 350 
intelligence to the reflexes approach’ (AIR) seeks to explain how embodied skills can be 351 
influenced by thinking and awareness and argues that “genuine expertise often requires the 352 
rapid switching of modes and styles within the performance context” (p. 93). For these 353 
researchers, skilful action relies on a mindedness that “facilitates the dynamic flexibility of 354 
attention, allowing it to be allocated freely and in a way that best meets contingent contextual 355 
demands” (Geeves et al. 2013, p. 3). Much like Shusterman’s argument, Sutton et al. claim 356 
that embodied action, on certain occasions, must be open to the influence of explicit 357 
knowledge or specific memories. When confronted by context-specific challenges (e.g., 358 
inefficient movement) in the training context, the performer can not rely entirely on 359 
spontaneous or non-cognitive responses but, instead, may use cue words or ‘instructional 360 
nudges’ as “verbal components of multi-modal embodied routines to distribute intelligence, 361 
coordinating or often re-setting and re-chunking patterns of movement” (p. 93).  362 
Additional evidence has emerged to suggest that movement through different stages 363 
of learning may not occur in the sequential and straightforward manner predicted by 364 
traditional theories of skill acquisition. For example, Gray (2004) found that expert baseball 365 
batters who experienced a slump in performance (i.e., an unexpected and prolonged period of 366 
poor performance), increased the amount of skill-focused attention they dedicated to 367 
performance in order to re-gain control of key actions. In attempting to explain this 368 
phenomenon, Gray (2004) suggested that the batter attempts to break out of the performance 369 
slump by cognitively modifying the component steps of skill acquisition. By contrast, when 370 
performing proficiently, skill-focused attention is replaced by the proceduralised (i.e., 371 
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automatic) execution of action. Interpreting these results, Gray argued that “expert 372 
performers may continuously cycle back and forth between these stages depending on the 373 
current level at which they are performing” (p.52). Furthermore, Gray suggested that 374 
“perhaps it is as important for an athlete to learn strategies for moving quickly and effectively 375 
from the cognitive to procedural stage (i.e., techniques for acquiring new procedural 376 
knowledge) as it is to achieve that level in the first place” (p. 52). Similarly, Ericsson’s 377 
deliberate practice framework proposes that expert performers seek to counteract 378 
automaticity, and thereby avoid ‘arrested development’, by remaining within the ‘cognitive’ 379 
and ‘associative’ stages by “developing increasingly complex mental representations to attain 380 
higher levels of control of their performance” (2006, p. 687). Both Gray and Ericsson’s 381 
argument appear to be in line with Shusterman’s concept of interchanging phases or stages of 382 
learning. Indeed, by drawing on the arguments of Gray (2004), Ericsson (2006) and 383 
Shusterman (2008) we suggest that somatic consciousness may play a crucial role in helping 384 
expert performers ‘cycle back and forth’ between these stages of learning – thereby helping 385 
to promote movement proficiency and to maintain performance effectiveness. More 386 
generally, Rossano (2003) has argued that “expertise requires deliberate practice. Deliberate 387 
practice requires consciousness” (p. 230). 388 
Central to Shusterman’s theory is the notion that the learning process does not 389 
suddenly stop once we have learned to habituate movements. Instead, learning is a continual 390 
process which is underpinned by a somaesthetic awareness of how we may improve our 391 
movement proficiency. As previously noted, such bodily awareness is important not only for 392 
learning new skills but also for “identifying, analyzing, and rectifying our problematic bodily 393 
habits” (Shusterman, 2008, p. 13). In downplaying the practical value of bodily 394 
consciousness, we are concerned that researchers have ignored the deliberate, and indeed 395 
conscious, manner in which expert performers actively seek to improve their current 396 
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performance level (see Ericsson, 2006).  Fortunately, a number of researchers have begun to 397 
consider the various ways in which elite athletes use bodily consciousness in their sporting 398 
actions. For example, Breivik (2007, 2013) has argued that a key feature of skill 399 
improvement amongst expert performers concerns the athletes’ desire to learn ‘new and 400 
better techniques’ and that this approach is “deliberate, conscious, and planned, which also 401 
characterises the activity itself” (p. 127). Furthermore Ravn and Christensen (2013) found 402 
that an elite golfer sought to optimise her performance proficiency by consciously refining 403 
her technique during training. The authors argue that continuous improvement requires the 404 
athlete to ‘experiment with and research their moving body’ and that the “unexamined body 405 
would simply not be worth moving” (Ravn & Christensen, 2013, p. 2). These emerging 406 
findings indicate that by constantly seeking and constructing practice situations that challenge 407 
their current level of performance, the expert athlete actively seeks to avoid the “arrested 408 
development associated with automaticity” (Ericsson, 2003, S.73). To help facilitate this 409 
process we argue that somaesthetic awareness may play an important role in helping us to 410 
identify the precise features of our movement that require refinement or improvement.  411 
Having drawn extensively on Shusterman’s (2008, 2009, 2011) work we believe it is 412 
important to consider the applied consequences of promoting an increase in bodily 413 
consciousness amongst skilled performers.  First, we argue that athletes’ must be somatically 414 
aware of their movement in order to identify that a problematic bodily habit has arisen. It is 415 
important to note that such an approach would not involve constant conscious surveillance of 416 
individual components of their overall movement pattern but rather a ‘proprioceptive feel’ of 417 
what they are doing. This requires athletes to be generally aware of whether their movement 418 
is causing discomfort or an outcome that is far removed from what they would normally 419 
expect. Here we are advocating the use of bodily awareness by athletes in paying heed to 420 
their movement and recognising when it is causing them pain, discomfort, or consistently 421 
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undesirable outcomes. This approach might actually help elite athletes to resist the kind of 422 
automation which a number of theorists ascribe to the highest levels of expertise, and address 423 
their concern that “trusting the body alone to take over will lead to arrested development” 424 
(Sutton et al. 2011, p. 95). Indeed, in line with Shusterman, we argue that it is only through 425 
such focused awareness can we learn to identify the bodily movements that are 426 
compromising the efficient execution of our desired movements and determine how we may 427 
“make the movement more successfully and with greater ease and grace” (2008, p. 166). 428 
Unfortunately, as outlined earlier, a continued reliance on spontaneity (or an external focus of 429 
attention) is unlikely to help us achieve this latter outcome. 430 
Second, once the technical problem has been identified (either by the athlete or the 431 
coach), correcting the ‘attenuated habit’ necessitates the reinvestment of on-line attentional 432 
control in order to refine or alter the problematic bodily movement. To help us accomplish 433 
such an aim, Shusterman (2008) suggested that we require a systematic method for the 434 
reconstruction of habit through the guidance of what he refers to as ‘constructive conscious 435 
control’ (p.193). We believe that Carson and Collins (2011) FIVE-A model of technical 436 
refinement may provide expert performers with such a system. Indeed, as alluded to earlier, a 437 
central feature of Carson and Collins’ model is the emphasis placed on the role conscious 438 
bodily awareness plays in addressing and correcting problematic movements. For example, 439 
once a coach has identified the specific aspect of technique which requires alteration the 440 
authors recommend that the problematic movement is called into consciousness and 441 
compared against the desired new technique. This approach aims to create ‘noise’ in the 442 
motor system by requiring the athlete to make sudden changes in their movement. 443 
Accordingly, the generation of a new movement pattern serves to make a clear distinction 444 
between the inefficient technique and the desired technique thereby driving the change 445 
process and preventing a return to the previous inefficient movement pattern. Once the new 446 
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movement has been successfully automated, a coach should assure his or her athlete that 447 
there is no need for further modifications.  448 
Of course, it would be remiss of us to ignore the possibility that consciously altering 449 
these habitual movements may hamper performance effectiveness in the short-run (Beilock et 450 
al. 2002). Indeed, Beilock and Gray (2007) suggest that reconstructing certain aspects of 451 
technique may involve slowing down and dechunking previous execution procedures, 452 
potentially resulting in a period of sub optimal performance. Supporting this latter idea, 453 
anecdotal evidence suggests that technical change can be a complicated process and that it 454 
may take some time before an expert performer can successfully alter what may have been a 455 
long-established movement pattern. Tiger Wood’s struggles in the wake of the technical 456 
changes he made to his golf swing during the 2011 season provide a striking case in point 457 
(see Eden, 2013).  In considering this issue, Carson and Collins (2011) outlined a number of 458 
psychosocial factors which may have an important influence on whether or not technical 459 
change is successfully accomplished. For example, they argue that a coach must ensure that 460 
the athlete is committed to and trusts the prescribed change so that they ‘buy into’ the entire 461 
process. Furthermore one could argue that during the initial stages of the technical change 462 
process, the expert performer may wish to confine his/her attempts at altering these 463 
movements to the training or practice ground until the new and desirable movement has been 464 
successfully automated (Nicholls, Holt, Polman, & James, 2005). Until such technical 465 
changes have been incorporated within the overall movement pattern, the expert performer 466 
may be required to deploy various psychological strategies to divert attention away from to 467 
the yet-to-be proceduralised movement during on-line competitive performance.  468 
One strategy for attentional redeployment is the adoption of a global/holistic cue word 469 
(Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008: Mullen & Hardy, 2010). This approach would involve two 470 
steps. First, performers would consciously focus on the new, desired technique during 471 
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training or practice sessions. In addition, during competitive performance, they would divert 472 
their focus of attention away from the yet-to-be automatised movement (i.e., which still 473 
requires an internal focus) and instead, focus on the external effects (i.e., trajectory of a 474 
struck ball in golf) of their actions. Of course, we recognise the difficulty performers may 475 
face when switching back-and–forth between reflective and more unreflective modes of 476 
consciousness. Unfortunately, until the new movement has become automatised and can be 477 
guided by spontaneity, a period of sub-optimal performance seems a likely by-product of the 478 
technical change process.  A coach/sport psychologist may play a crucial role at this juncture 479 
by emphasizing the need for the athlete to remain patient and to place trust in the technical 480 
change process (Carson & Collins, 2011). Hopefully, with continued deliberate and 481 
constructive practice, conscious attempts to refine and alter one’s inefficient habitual 482 
movements will lead to performance benefits as skill execution begins to ‘more closely 483 
mirror desired outcomes’ (Beilock & Gray, 2007, p. 432).  484 
It is also necessary to identify the methodological approaches that may be best suited 485 
to addressing the questions raised by Shusterman’s model of body consciousness. 486 
Unfortunately, laboratory investigations which seek to identify reproducibly superior 487 
performance under standardized conditions (see Ericsson & Ward, 2007) are unlikely to help 488 
us identify the mechanisms which allow performers to alternate between different modes of 489 
attentional processing over the course of a competitive season/career. In seeking to address 490 
this latter issue, researchers may wish to use naturalistic investigations (involving 491 
observations and interviews) or explore athletes’ phenomenological insights through the use 492 
of stimulated recall (SR) interviews. Bernier, Codron, Thienot and Fournier (2011) used a 493 
combination of these approaches in a study which examined the attentional foci adopted by 494 
elite golfers in training and performance contexts. Having filmed participants in a training 495 
session and during a competitive event, self-confrontation interviews were used to stimulate 496 
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recall (whilst watching a video recording) of the thoughts the performer was processing. 497 
Participants were shown sequences involving an action (e.g., a shot), a preparatory behaviour 498 
(e.g., the pre-shot routine), and the step following an action (e.g., walking to the next shot) 499 
and were urged to express their thoughts during each sequence. Rather than providing an 500 
explanation of how they solved the task or a summary of the general strategy they adopted, 501 
performers merely expressed their thoughts during each sequence. Findings revealed that 502 
these elite golfers alternated between internal and external foci of attention across the 503 
preparatory, execution and evaluative stages of training and competitive performance. 504 
Naturalistic investigations appear to offer researchers a potentially fruitful means of 505 
exploring the attentional switching mechanisms that seem to characterise ‘continuous 506 
improvement’ in elite sport. 507 
An important aim of the current paper was to outline and discuss recent anecdotal and 508 
empirical evidence which suggests that our habitual movements are not immutable and that 509 
they may, on occasion, require conscious alteration. We believe that such evidence calls into 510 
question traditional (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) and contemporary (e.g., Wulf, 2013) skill 511 
learning perspectives that we should rely on ‘unthinking spontaneity’ or external foci of 512 
attention in facilitating the smooth and efficient execution of skilled movement. However, in 513 
line with a number of contemporary philosophers (e.g., Breivik, 2013; Montero, 2010; 514 
Shusterman, 2008), sport psychologists have begun to consider the functional role 515 
consciousness may play in facilitating movement proficiency at the elite level of sport. For 516 
example, some authors have suggested that “some conscious processing is permitted 517 
providing it does not ‘overwhelm’ attentional resources” (Carson & Collins, 2011, p. 149) 518 
and that a performer may occasionally need to alter proceduralized knowledge that has been 519 
“judged to be unproductive on the basis of cognitive self-regulation of his actions” (Gray, 520 
2004, p.52). These converging perspectives represent a significant shift in thinking and open 521 
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up the possibility that consciousness may not represent the disruptive force traditionally 522 
portrayed by many sport psychologists and motor learning theorists. However, despite these 523 
new perspectives sport psychology has yet to devise a theory which recognises the value of 524 
both reflective somatic/bodily consciousness and spontaneous, unreflective bodily perception 525 
and performance. This paper has argued that Shusterman’s (2008) theory of body 526 
consciousness may be useful in helping researchers achieve this latter aim. Building on 527 
Shusterman’s (2008) work, future researchers may wish to construct a typology as a first step 528 
in attempting to explain how the effects of specific types of conscious processing (e.g., 529 
conscious control, conscious monitoring, somaesthetic awareness) on movement and 530 
performance proficiency are likely to be moderated by skill level, performance situations 531 
(training or competition) and by the distinctive demands of sports (e.g., whether they are 532 
object-related sports such as golf or non-object related sports such as running). 533 
We wish to conclude by recognising the difficulty performers may face in switching 534 
between reflective (e.g., internal foci) and more unreflective (e.g., external foci) modes of 535 
bodily awareness. However, we have drawn on Shusterman’s work to argue that such an 536 
approach is necessary for two specific reasons. First, the learning process is never entirely 537 
complete and elite performers appear to actively seek new ways of improving both their 538 
movement and performance proficiency (see Ravn & Christensen, 2013). Somaesthetic 539 
reflection may play an important role here by first allowing the performer to identify the 540 
inefficient movement pattern and then helping him/her to consciously attend to its alteration 541 
or refinement.  Second, the apparent fragility of our habitual movements means that we have 542 
little choice but to devise creative solutions in order to address these disruptions. A reliance 543 
on an external focus of attention will not be enough to maintain our performance proficiency 544 
if our habitual movements are dysfunctional in some way. Instead, we must seek effective 545 
ways of using constructive conscious control to help us refine, alter and thus improve our 546 
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‘attenuated’ habits. Only then may athletes relinquish conscious control of their bodily 547 
performance and allow somaesthetic awareness to guide their new movement and, hopefully, 548 
help them to achieve new levels of excellence.  549 
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